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ABSTRACT
India seems to have followed an idiosyncratic pattern of development, certainly compared to other
fast-growing Asian economies. While the emphasis on services rather than manufacturing has been
widely noted, within manufacturing India has emphasized skill-intensive rather than labor-intensive
manufacturing, and industries with typically higher average scale. We show that some of these
distinctive patterns existed even prior to the beginning of economic reforms in the 1980s, and argue
they stem from the idiosyncratic policies adopted soon after India's independence. We then look to
the future, using the growth of fast-moving Indian states as a guide. Despite recent reforms that have
removed some of the policy impediments that might have sent India down its distinctive path, it
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
With an average of 13 million people expected to enter India’s labor force each year for the 
next four decades, many have expressed concerns about the relatively jobless growth of the 
last fifteen years (see, for example, Mehta, 2005). While China, the world’s manufacturing 
powerhouse, appears to be absorbing surplus labor from agriculture into manufacturing, there 
is growing concern that India has failed to match its neighbor in this process. To many, 
India’s emergence as a world-class services hub offers scant comfort because of the 
relatively limited prospects of such skill-based development for employment growth. In 
addition, worries are mounting about the uneven distribution of opportunities across states 
(the fast –growing peninsula versus the slow-moving hinterland), sectors (services versus 
manufacturing or agriculture), and skill and education levels (call-centers versus cow-herds). 
In particular, can India foster growth in labor-intensive manufacturing? If yes, how? If not, 
how can jobs be provided for India’s vast, growing, pool of low-skilled labor?  These are 
some of the questions addressed in this paper. 
 
To preview the answers, we argue that the nature of the policies India followed after 
independence in 1947 created unique specializations prior to the economic reforms that 
started in the 1980s. Relative to other comparable poor countries, India’s emphasis on 
tertiary education, combined with a variety of policy distortions, may have channeled the 
manufacturing sector into more skill-intensive industries. Furthermore, the government’s 
desire to create capital goods production capability, especially through public-sector 
involvement, implied that India had a greater presence in industries that required scale (and 
capital) than other developing countries. Regulatory penalties and constraints on large private 
enterprise implied, however, that within most industries, the average scale of enterprise was 
relatively small. Finally, rigid labor laws as well as constraints on the scale of private 
enterprises may well have limited India’s presence in labor intensive manufacture, the usual 
specialization in a populous developing country. Given these idiosyncratic policies, India had 
a far more diversified presence across manufacturing industries than the typical developing 
country. Interestingly, it had a lower-than-normal presence in services in the early 1980s, 
where the skill intensive segments such as telecommunications were still dominated by the 
slow-moving public sector. 
 
Recent trends reflect a continuation of some of the patterns that existed prior to the beginning 
of economic reforms in the 1980s, especially in the continuing movement away from labor 
intensive industries and towards skill intensive industries. The big change has been in 
services, which have grown substantially, especially in skill intensive segments like 
telecommunications (as the private sector has been allowed in) and other business services 
(activities such as software and business process outsourcing that have benefited from the 
opening of the economy), but also in finance-intensive segments like construction. 
 
We then look ahead, using the growth of fast-moving Indian states as a crystal ball. Despite 
economic reforms that have removed some of the policy impediments that sent India down 
its idiosyncratic path, it appears unlikely that India will revert to the pattern followed by   - 3 - 
 
other countries. There have been changes, no doubt in patterns of activity. But states are not 
increasing their presence in labor intensive industries, as one might expect if there were a 
reversion to the presumed typical pattern of growth for a poor country.  
 
Instead, economic reforms combined with growing decentralization of policy-making appear 
to have allowed states to use the capabilities built up over the period of heavy policy 
intervention—in other words, freed them to grow at a pace consistent with their built-up skill 
base and institutional, as well as infrastructural, capability. On the one hand, this freedom has 
increased India’s overall growth rate. On the other, it has led to a considerable divergence 
between states in growth and incomes and in the pattern of specialization. The fast-growing 
peninsular states are starting to resembling industrial countries in their specialization, moving 
towards skill-intensive services and manufacturing. But the areas where India has built 
capabilities serve least well the populous, institution- and infrastructure-poor states of the 
hinterland. Whether these states can develop appropriate growth strategies, and whether these 
strategies will be impeded or helped by the growth of the more advanced states is a central 
question for India’s economic future. We offer some conjectures, and discuss policy 
implications. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. We first examine India’s pattern of development 
circa 1980 on the grounds that a snap shot at this point reflects the legacy of India’s unique 
and much-commented upon development strategy: a curious combination of simultaneously 
favoring and disfavoring domestic entrepreneurship with a rich overlay of arcane rules and 
procedures. We then examine what happened between 1980 and 2001 to see how the shift in 
policies from dirigisme to greater reliance on the market affected the pattern of development, 
especially for fast-moving states. We then use this post-1980s experience as a basis to 
speculate about the future. 
 
II.   INDIA CIRCA 1980 
How should India’s development strategy since Independence in 1947 and until the early 
1980s be characterized? Many excellent books and papers have been written about this, and 
we refer the reader to them for details.
1 A (perhaps overly) simplified view of the main 
aspects, however, would include: 
 
(i) A focus on self sufficiency to avoid dependence on imports, and hence excessive external 
influence on domestic affairs. This view was understandable in a country emerging from 
colonialism, and which saw itself as an exemplar for other developing countries. It translated 
into an emphasis on rapid industrialization, especially the creation of domestic heavy 
                                                 
1 The canonical references are Bhagwati and Desai (1970), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1993), 
Joshi and Little (1994), and Krueger (1975).    - 4 - 
 
industries—that is industries producing capital goods 
2 In addition, the pattern of 
industrialization focused on reducing dependence on foreign exchange through import 
substitution. Trade restrictions were the inevitable side effect of these policies.  
 
(ii) To ensure that investible resources were channeled to the “right” industries, and given 
that India was capital-poor, Indian planners devised a combination of heavy public sector 
involvement (with some industries—the “commanding heights”—being reserved only for the 
public sector) and controlled private sector involvement.  
 
(iii) Unlike many developing countries, independent India always allowed private sector 
activity. But to be consistent with the planning strategy, there had to be ways to control the 
private sector and this was done through investment licensing, import licensing, controls on 
the use of foreign exchange, controls on credit allocation, and controls on prices. Also, the 
threat always remained that the government would enter even those industries which were 
not explicitly reserved for the public sector (the threat was realized in 1969 when Indira 
Gandhi nationalized a number of private banks). In addition to maintaining coherence with 
the planning framework, a separate reason to control the private sector was to avoid undue 
concentration of economic power. 
 
Additional mechanisms to enforce this objective included the Monopoly and Restrictive 
Trade Practices act (MRTP)—which imposed severe constraints on expansion by large firms 
and groups, and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA).  
 
(iv) In order to encourage labor intensive manufacture in the private sector, significant 
benefits were given to small scale firms (these included tax concessions and holidays, 
preferential access to credit, subsidized interest rates, and preferential treatment in 
procurement by the government). In addition, some goods were exclusively reserved for 
production by the small scale sector.
3 
 
(v) At the same time, however, significant protections for labor, especially in large firms, 
were enacted. For example, an amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act (1947) in 1976 
made it compulsory for firms with 300 or more workers to seek the permission of the 
relevant government to dismiss workers. In 1982, the ceiling for seeking permission to 
dismiss workers was lowered to 100 workers.  
 
                                                 
2 Recall that the most successful example of development around the time of India’s 
independence was Soviet Russia, and many of independent India’s early leaders, including 
Jawaharlal Nehru, were greatly influenced by it.  P.C. Mahalanobis, the father of Indian 
planning viewed the capacity to “make machines that make machines” as crucial to the 
economy’s long-term rate of growth. 
3 See Mohan (2002) for more details.   - 5 - 
 
(vi) Also, for a variety of reasons (see Wiener (1990) for one view), for a poor country India 
spent, and still spends, relatively far more resources on higher education than on primary 
education. For example, India spent 86 percent of per capita GDP on each student in tertiary 
education in 2000 while it spent 14 percent of per capita GDP per student in primary 
education. By contrast, China spent 10.7 percent and 12.1 percent, respectively of per capita 
GDP per student in tertiary and primary education. Put another way, India spent substantially 
more in PPP adjusted dollars per student in tertiary education than China, and even Korea or 
Indonesia in 2000. 
 
So what was the legacy of this complex web of policies in terms of the pattern of 
development? We turn to this in the next section and examine various aspects of this 
pattern—sectoral shares of output and employment; factor-use; size; and diversification. 
 
But before we do that, a caveat. Historically, India has been gifted with many clever theorists 
and statisticians. Unfortunately, the quality of Indian data has not matched the quality of its 
users (see, for example, Srinivasan (2003)). As a result, much extant work focuses on 
deploring the quality of Indian data, and attempting to correct problems through careful 
econometrics. Unfortunately again, this focus has also dampened the quantum of empirical 
work, especially policy relevant empirical work. While acknowledging problems with the 
data, we will not dwell on their inadequacies. Instead, we will attempt to tease out broad 
patterns, and in a variety of ways, both of which might make the work less susceptible to 
concerns about the data. That said, all findings are subject to the caveat that the data are what 
they are.  
 
A.   Value Added Shares in 1981
4 
Did 30 years of dirigisme post-independence distort manufacturing? This is the first question 
we address. In Table 1, we present the share of output in the different sectors in India in 1981 
and compare it with that in a number of developing and developed countries. At a little over  
16 percent of GDP, India’s share in manufacturing seems low, especially when compared 
with a number of East Asian countries and China. But from the work of Kuznets and 
Chenery, we know that the manufacturing share varies with the level of development, rising 
and then falling off once a country approaches a high level of income. So one way to check 
whether India’s share of manufacturing is too low is to see if it is “too low” correcting for its 
level of income, the square of the level of income (to correct for non-linearities), and also 
size.
5  
                                                 
4 That the data are what they are does not mean we ignore problems. For example, there are 
aberrations in the Indian data for 1980 that do not appear in subsequent years. This is why we 
use data from 1981. 
5 Of course, other factors could also affect sectoral shares (see, for example, Chenery and 
Taylor (1968)), but our intent here is primarily to see whether India is an outlier after 
correcting for obvious factors, rather than to do an exhaustive study of the sectoral 
(continued)   - 6 - 
 
In Table 2, we report the results of cross-section regressions of a country’s sectoral share in 
total output on these variables and an indicator for India. First, correcting only for the income 
terms, India is a positive outlier among countries in its share of value added in manufacturing 
in 1981 with its share significantly exceeding the norm by 4.6 percentage points (see Table 2, 
column 1). However, after correcting for country size (proxied for by land area), the 
coefficient on the India indicator declines to 2.3 percentage points in 1981 which is not 
statistically significant (column 2).
6 In what follows, when we refer to a coefficient without 
qualification, it is to the estimate in the specification including country size.  
 
If anything it is in services that India is an outlier in 1981 (columns 3 and 4), and a negative 
one at that. India’s share of services in value added is significantly below that for other 
countries in 1981 (about 3.6 percentage points lower after correcting for income and size, 
column 4). Again, this seems surprising from today’s vantage point.  
 
The robust take-away here is that India was not an outlier on manufacturing in 1981, given 
its per capita GDP and size. The conventional wisdom that India under-performs in 
manufacturing could either be because it underperformed over the next 20 years, or because 
it is compared with China, which is a significant positive outlier in 1981 (the coefficient for 
the China indicator is highly significant, with the coefficient suggesting that even after 
controlling for income and size China’s manufacturing is an astonishing 29 percentage points 
of GDP greater than that for the average country).
7  
 
B.   Employment Shares in 1981 and Productivity
8 
When India’s share of industrial sector employment in total employment is compared with 
other countries, India again does not seem to be an outlier (Table 2, columns 5 and 6). In the 
                                                                                                                                                       
composition of growth. We will report results for the largest sample of countries, though the 
results are qualitatively similar unless specifically noted for a cross-section restricted to non-
OECD countries. 
 
6 The picture is slightly different when one looks at the share of value added in the industrial 
sector—which includes manufacturing, mining, construction and core infrastructure 
industries like electricity, water, and gas. We find that the coefficient on the India indicator is 
negative 3 percentage points, although it is not statistically significant.  
7 By contrast, China was a large negative outlier in services in 1981, with a share in GDP 
about 15 percentage points less than for the typical country, controlling for income and size. 
8 Comparable cross-country data on employment shares are not available separately for the 
manufacturing sector, only for industry (manufacturing, mining, and core infrastructure 
sectors), and services. Thus the analysis of employment shares is conducted for industry and 
services.    - 7 - 
 
case of services (columns 7 and 8), however, India seems to have a significant 7.5 percentage 
point lower employment share than other countries, after controlling for income and size.  
In estimates that are not reported, we find that India was a significant positive outlier with 
respect to relative productivity in industry and services in the cross-section in 1981, 
suggesting productivity in agriculture was low. 
 
C.   Use of factors: Labor intensity, skill intensity 
What did the policies do in terms of industry specialization? The analysis below is limited to 
the manufacturing sector where we have comparable cross country data from the UNIDO. 
The first industry characteristic we examine is labor intensity, where the proxy for labor 
intensity is the share of wages in value added for the industry in a country averaged across a 
broad group of developing countries—examples of industries that score highest on labor 
intensity are clothing, printing and publishing, and non-electrical machinery while those that 
score lowest are beverages, tobacco, and petroleum refineries (Table 3). 
 
We examine the pattern of output within manufacturing to see whether India had a bias in 
1981 in favor of labor-intensive activities. We first divide industries into those that are above 
the median and those below the median in terms of labor-intensity. Then, for each country, 
we calculate the ratio of the total value added by above-median-labor-intensity industries to 
the total value added by below-median-labor-intensity industries. If Indian manufacturing 
generates relatively more value added in labor intensive industries, then in a cross-country 
regression of this ratio against log per capita GDP, its square, and an indicator for India, the 
India indicator should be positive and significant (see Table 4, Panel A, column 1).
9 
However, the coefficient is negative and insignificant. The coefficient on the India indicator 
is moderately negative again when the dependent variable is the ratio of employment shares 
(see Table 4, Panel B, column 1). When we regress the ratio of productivity in above median 
labor intensive industries to below median industries in 1981 against income and size, we 
find that the India indicator is positive and significant (Table 4, Panel C, column 1).
10 
 
Let us now turn to skill intensity.
11 To characterize the skill-intensity of a sector, we use data 
from the input-output matrix for South Africa, which contains data on 45 sectors and 5 
primary factors of production—capital plus four categories of labor: highly skilled, skilled, 
unskilled, and informal sector (see Alleyne and Subramanian, 2001). As a proxy for the skill 
                                                 
9 Including country size in the regression does not change the results.  
10 In a number of places in this paper, we use the median to divide industries. As a robustness 
check, we also grouped them into the top and bottom third, excluding the middle third to 
avoid possible misclassification of industries. Our results remained qualitatively unchanged 
using this alternative classification. 
11 We are grateful to Aaditya Mattoo for suggesting the idea of exploring skill intensity.   - 8 - 
 
intensity of an industry we use the share of remuneration of the highly skilled and skilled 
categories of workers in total value added.
12 The categorization of industries according to 
skill is in Table 3. The most skill intensive industries are printing, other chemicals, and 
professional and scientific equipment. The least skill intensive include textiles, leather, 
footwear, and wood products. The correlation between an industry’s labor intensity and its 
skill intensity is positive but small and not statistically significant, suggesting they capture 
different things. 
 
For each country, we calculate the ratio of the total value added by above-median-skill-
intensity manufacturing industries to the total value added by below-median-skill-intensity 
industries, and regress that against income, its square, and size. It is striking that even by 
1981, India was specializing in skill-intensive industries: in Table 4, column 2 in Panels A 
and B, the India indicator both in terms of output and employment shares is positive and 
highly significant. India was thus more specialized in skill-intensive products than other 
countries with similar levels of income and size. Also, relative labor productivity in skilled 
industries is higher in India (Panel C, column 2).  
 
D.   Industry scale 
We now establish two facts about the “scale” of Indian enterprise. First, manufacturing was 
unusually concentrated in industries that typically require large scale. Second, however,  
within industries, the array of policies that targeted size appear to have had their intended 
effect, with Indian firms unusually small relative to firms in the same industry in other 
countries.   
 
We measure size in two different ways—as value added per establishment and as 
employment per establishment. It is plausible that the optimal scale of establishments could 
vary across industries – for example, an integrated steel plant is much larger than a tannery. 
The average size of establishments in an industry, averaged across countries, could be a 
proxy for optimal scale. However, at least two factors may affect this. First, to the extent that 
the size of the domestic market matters, a larger country would be associated with larger 
establishments (see the evidence in Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (2000), for example). 
Second, the coverage of manufacturing data can vary across countries, with the smallest 
firms being covered in some countries and not in others. 
 
                                                 
12 The choice of South Africa was dictated primarily by data availability, although we have 
checked the robustness of our results to alternative definitions of skill intensity, including 
restricting the definition to the highly skilled category and defining skill intensity in terms of 
share of remuneration in output rather than value added. We also checked the correlation of 
our measures of skill intensity with that compiled for the U.S. by Rajan and Wulf (2004). It  
is 0.66, for the highly skilled category, and 0.5 when skill intensity includes highly skilled 
and skilled workers.   - 9 - 
 
For these reasons, we cannot simply take the average of the value added per establishment 
(or employees per establishment) in an industry across countries to get a measure of scale for 
the industry.
13 Instead, we focus on relative size, that is, we find the relative size of 
establishments in an industry in a country by dividing the value added (or employment ) per 
establishment in the industry by the value added (or employment) per establishment in the 
country. It is this relative size that we average across countries for each industry to find a 
measure of the scale of establishments in that industry. 
 
The industries with the largest scale across countries are petroleum refineries, tobacco, and 
iron and steel, while that with the smallest scale is furniture (Table 3). The ranking of 
industries differs only marginally across our two measures of establishment size, so we will 
use the measure based on value added per establishment. The results do not differ 
qualitatively if we use the other measure. 
 
 We find that the ratio of value added in above-median scale industries to that below is 
significantly higher in India (Table 4, Panel A, column 3). Interestingly, relative employment 
shares in above-median scale industries is also significantly higher in India relative to other 
countries (see Panel B, column 3). As a result relative productivity is somewhat lower for 
above-median-scale industries in India, but not significantly so (Panel C, column 3).   
The correlation between scale and labor intensity is strongly negative and significant (-0.59) 
while the correlation between scale and skill intensity is small (-0.01) and insignificant (see 
Table 3). This suggests that our measure of scale proxies for capital intensity, which in turn 
offers an explanation for why production is concentrated in the large-scale sectors in India; 
Indian planners laid emphasis on building capital intensive, large scale, heavy industries 
because of their belief that “machines that made machines” would boost savings and hence 
long-run growth. They also commandeered these sectors for the public sector, and many of 
the impediments to scale that were faced by the private sector simply did not apply to the 
public sector. Moreover, employment was an implicit objective in the public sector. As a 
result, a capital scarce country was overrepresented, both in terms of value added and 
employment, in the capital intensive/large scale segments of industry. 
 
The real impact of the discriminatory policy regime against private sector scale (industrial 
licensing, reservation and other incentives for small scale sectors, and the MRTP Act) may 
then have been felt within industry rather than between industries. With the caveats about 
cross-country comparisons of establishment size noted above, and some attempt at correcting 
for them, we find that the average size of firms in India is substantially below that in other 
countries—this is true in the aggregate and in almost every industry.  In Chart 1, we contrast 
the average firm size in India with the average firm size in 10 emerging market countries for 
                                                 
13 We would be mixing industries represented in large countries or countries with extensive 
coverage with industries represented in small countries or countries with little coverage, 
reducing comparability.   - 10 - 
 
manufacturing as a whole and for the nine largest industries in India.
14 The contrast is 
striking: for example, the average firm size in manufacturing in India is about US$300,000 
per firm whereas it is about US$4 million in the comparator countries—a multiple exceeding 
10. Parenthetically, note that in the chart, the pattern of size across industries in India 
matches the pattern in comparator countries (with, for example, Iron and Steel or Industrial 
Chemicals being large and Food Products small), albeit at a much lower level, verifying that 
relative size is a distinctive characteristic of an industry that holds across countries.  
 
Some of the regulations, especially those pertaining to labor, applied only to registered firms 
that exceeded a certain size. So the effects of the regulatory regime should be seen on another 
margin – we should see relatively more activity in labor intensive industries done by 
unregistered firms. Using data from unregistered manufacturing, we find the ratio of value 
added in above-median labor intensive industries to that in below median labor intensive 
industries in unregistered manufacturing (obtained from the Central Statistical Organization) 
is significantly higher (by about 2 times in 1980) than in registered manufacturing.
15  By 
contrast, labor laws were less applicable to non-unionized, highly skilled workers—for  
example, to professionals. So we should find the ratio of value added in above-median skill 
intensive industries to that in below median skill intensive industries in unregistered 
manufacturing is not significantly higher than in registered manufacturing. It is not—quite 
the opposite, the ratio of above-to below-median skill intensive industries in the unregistered 
sector is about ¼ of that in the registered sector.
16  
 
E.   Diversification 
Before we discuss these findings, let us add one more fact, which follows from the facts on 
labor-intensity, skill and size. Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) show that in the course of 
development, countries first diversify within manufacturing, producing many things, and 
                                                 
14 In presenting this stylized fact, we attempt to avoid possible biases. We first compared 
manufacturing output from UNIDO and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
The UNIDO database only covers the registered manufacturing sector in India, defined as 
firms not using power and employing 20 or more people, or firms using power and 
employing 10 or more people. Hence the UNIDO data are biased toward larger firms in 
India. The UNIDO data covers about 60 percent of the data reported in the WDI. For the 
purposes of comparison with other countries, we eliminated countries where the UNIDO data 
had a lower share of total value added in manufacturing than in India. This would bias our 
test towards finding that India had relatively larger firms. 
15 Recall that what we have reported thus far are figures from registered manufacturing using 
UNIDO data. 
16 The fact that the ratio is so much lower in the unregistered sector suggests that skill-
intensive sectors might require a larger scale of operation for technological reasons.   - 11 - 
 
then after a certain level of income, start specializing, producing fewer things. Technically, 
the relationship between the concentration of value added across industries (the Gini 
coefficient or the Herfindahl index), and income is U-shaped, with the turning point 
occurring at about US$10,000 per capita.   
 
Given that India has a more skill-based and scale-based (typically more capital-intensive) 
pattern of production, the presumption would be that it has specialized in more areas than the 
typical developing country, and hence it should exhibit a more diverse pattern of production. 
When we examine the concentration of Indian industry compared to the average country 
pattern, we find that India is significantly less concentrated (or more diversified), not just in 
terms of the distribution of value-added across industries, but also when concentration is 
measured in terms of employment (Panels A and B, column 4 in table 4). The coefficient on 
the India indicator when the dependent variable is the concentration of value-added is -0.07, 
and it is -0.06  when the dependent variable is the concentration of employment. In other 
words, India has an output and employment profile across industries that is approximately 
one standard deviation less concentrated than that for the average country, suggesting a 
broader array of skills/capabilities in the labor force.   
 
The contrast with China is interesting. At first blush, China’s index which is close to that for 
India would suggest that China too is an outlier in terms of diversification.  It turns out, 
however, that after controlling for size, China is not unusually diversified in the cross-section 
whereas India is.  
 
F.   The effects of pre-1980s policies:  Summary and Discussion 
To summarize, compared with countries at a similar level of development and size, in 1981 
India had approximately the normal share of output and employment in manufacturing. 
Output in services was below the norm, as was employment in services. Manufacturing 
output and employment appeared to be above the norm in industries that typically are skill 
intensive or have larger establishments. Average establishment size was substantially smaller 
than in comparable countries. And finally, Indian manufacturing was significantly more 
diversified both in terms of output and employment than countries of comparable income and 
size. 
 
One seemingly anomalous finding captures the strange pattern of India’s development. This 
relates to the high relative labor productivity observed in the labor-intensive sectors in India, 
which raises the question of why this did not, for example, translate into exports of labor-
intensive goods. We offer three possible explanations. First, the high relative labor 
productivity could simply be the converse of the low labor productivity in the large-scale 
capital-intensive industries, the latter itself a result of the fact that these were dominated by 
state owned firms where over-staffing was a common phenomenon and even an objective. 
Second, the stringent labor laws that make it hard to lay off labor and the consequent 
hesitancy to hire (and to drive down marginal labor productivity to the value maximizing 
level) could also explain why productivity is moderately higher in labor intensive industries. 
Third, the discrimination against size that we have noted above may well have limited the   - 12 - 
 
labor-intensive sector’s incentive and ability to exploit economies of scale and generate large 
volumes of exports. 
 
The paradox of Indian manufacturing in the early 1980s is thus that of a labor-rich, capital-
poor economy using too little of the former, and using the latter very inefficiently.
17 The 
reason, simply put, was perverse policy. Unlike the East Asian economies, which drew 
employment from agriculture into manufacturing at a rapid pace, India did not.  
 
The one area where Indian manufacturing appears to have thrived is in the industries using 
highly skilled labor. The far greater investment in tertiary education for a country of its per-
capita income—of which the Indian Institutes of Technology and the Indian Institutes of 
Management are just the best-known examples—resulted in the plentiful availability of 
highly skilled, cheap, labor. This then enabled India to generate relatively greater value 
added and employment in skill-intensive industries as compared to the typical poor country.  
 
As far as services were concerned, India was a significant negative outlier in 1981. In part, 
this may have been because the slow-moving public sector again dominated areas like 
telecommunications and business services where India’s advantage in skills (as evidenced by 
the pattern of specialization in manufacturing) might have been used. By contrast, sectors 
like retail and construction were left to the private sector, where the limited access to finance 
(both for the service provider and the customer) kept businesses small and growth limited.  
 
Finally, the greater diversification of Indian manufacturing could be explained as a 
consequence of all the policy distortions. The import substitution strategy, the skewed pattern 
of education, as well as the encouragement given to the public sector to invest in areas that 
are typically not a poor country’s comparative advantage, may well have driven India into 
industries that other countries at comparable income levels shy away from.  
 
In this cloud of distortion may well have resided a silver lining—in creating capabilities that 
did not exist in the typical poor country, India may have created potential sources of growth 
that would allow it to follow a different growth path from other countries as policy 
distortions were removed. Put another way, unique distortions may well have created unique 
sources of comparative advantage that allowed India to follow a different path. It is that path 
that we now explore.  
 
                                                 
17 It may well be, of course, that India’s labor intensive production was concentrated in the 
unregistered sector, for which we do not have comparable data from other countries. To the 
extent that firms in the unregistered sector have inefficiently small scale, total production 
would still be smaller and less competitive than it could be without the spectrum of 
regulations. Also, unregistered labor intensive production has been falling considerably over 
time, suggesting that this explanation for India’s lack of concentration in labor intensive 
manufacturing is less applicable today.    - 13 - 
 
III.   HOW HAS INDIA CHANGED SINCE THE  EARLY 1980S? 
A.   Policy Changes Since the 1980s 
A number of observers (see, for example, Kohli (2005), Rodrik and Subramanian (2005), 
Virmani (2005)) have noted the pro-business tilt of the Indian economy beginning in the 
early 1980s, away from controls and repression of the domestic private sector. The pace of 
reforms accelerated in the early 1990s, in the wake of the external crisis. 
 
The reforms have been attributed to various causes ranging from a realization that the 
panoply of controls were self-defeating, to a realization by the Congress Party that given the 
growing challenges to its power, it had to woo business (see Kohli (2005)). 
 
The key features of reforms in the 1980s were (i) import liberalization—especially of capital 
goods and intermediate inputs—primarily through the expansion of the range and number of 
goods on the open general licensing list and through a reduction in canalization;  (ii) the 
extension of export incentives through the tax system, and more liberal access to credit and 
foreign exchange; (iii) the significant relaxation of industrial licensing requirements through 
direct “delicensing” of some industries and through “broad banding” which permitted firms 
in some industries to switch production between similar product lines; (iv) decontrol of 
administered prices of key intermediate inputs. Kohli (2005) and Rodrik and Subramanian 
(2005) characterize the reforms of the 1980s as having been “pro-business” in orientation.  
 
The reforms of the 1990s—which some have distinguished from the reforms of the 1980s as 
having been “pro-market” in orientation—included (i) the abolition of industrial licensing 
and the narrowing of the scope of public sector monopolies to a much smaller number of 
industries; (ii) the liberalization of inward foreign direct and portfolio investment; (iii) 
sweeping trade liberalization including the elimination of import licensing and the 
progressive reduction of nontariff barriers; (iv) major financial sector liberalization, 
including the removal of controls on capital issues, freer entry for domestic, and foreign, 
private banks and the opening up of the insurance sector; (v) and liberalization of investment 
and trade in important services, such as telecommunications. Areas that remained largely 
untouched by reforms in the 1990s were the labor market; small scale reservations (where 
there has been some movement only in the last 4-5 years); privatization both of nonfinancial 
enterprises and of banks; and further agricultural sector reforms.  
 
The reforms are reflected in the sharp acceleration in all underlying measures of growth: for 
example, the annual average rate of growth of GDP per worker increased from 0.7 percent in 
the 1970s to 3.9 and 3.3 percent, respectively in the 1980s and 1990s, while TFP growth 
increased from -0.5 percent to 2.5 and 1.6 percent over the same time. (Ahluwalia, 1991 and 
1995, Unel, 2003).  That there was a decisive break in India’s growth pattern is documented 
in De Long (2003), Rodrik and Subramanian (2005), and Williamson and Zagha (2002).  
  
How have these twenty years of reform, slow and sluggish yet consistent, affected the pattern 
of development, if at all? We first look at the evolution in the variables discussed above—  - 14 - 
 
sectoral shares, factor intensities, size and diversification, between the early 1980s and early 
2000s. Our prior was that given the distinct turn towards business and markets and away 
from controls, any anomalies in the pattern of development or in their underlying trend 
should have been corrected or at least arrested. The data, as we will see, did not support this 
prior.  
 
B.   Manufacturing versus services in the cross-section 
The traditional view proposed by Kuznets and Chenery would suggest a rapid increase in the 
share of manufacturing with a decline in agriculture and an uncertain or modest effect on 
services. However, between 1980 and 2002, India’s share of services in value added went up 
from 37 percent to 49 percent, while its share of manufacturing in value added remained 
broadly unchanged at 16 percent, with the decline in agriculture mirroring the performance of 
services.
18 The corresponding numbers for employment were 19 percent to 22 percent and 14 
percent to 18 percent.  
 
Is this evolution in sectoral shares unusual when compared with other countries? We can 
check this in a number of ways. We can re-do the analysis that we did for 1980 for the latest 
period, 2002 (i.e. running cross-country level regressions). We can also see if the change in 
share of a country’s activity in manufacturing or services is unusual after controlling for per 
capita income and the overall growth rate. We report the results of these exercises in Table 5.  
 
We find manufacturing over this time period tended to perform less well than in other 
countries after controlling for the other variables but not significantly so.
19 In the regressions 
using the change in the share of manufacturing value-added to overall growth (column 1, 
Panel B), the India indicator is negative. Similarly, in the level regressions for 2000 (column 
1, panel A), the coefficient of the India indicator is smaller than in the corresponding 
specification for 1981. Thus, a pattern of a relative slowing in manufacturing growth is 
suggested by the data, ironically when reforms were removing the shackles on 
manufacturing.   
 
Of course, what is indisputable is the performance of services over this period. India has been 
unusual in this regard. For example, in the 2000 level regressions, the India indicator is 
positive and significant (Table 5, panel A, column 4): the coefficient suggests that India’s 
share is significantly higher (3.8 percentage points) than in other countries. This is broadly 
                                                 
18 This development appears to contradict the Kuznets-Chenery hypothesis. Kongsamut, 
Rebelo, and Xie (2001), however, argue based on an analysis of 123 countries over the 
period 1970-89 that the share of services rises more with development than anticipated in the 
Kuznets-Chenery view.  
19 However, we find that industry (that is, manufacturing, mining and core infrastructure 
industries) was a significant negative outlier in 2000, possibly related to the much worse than 
average performance of India’s infrastructure sector.    - 15 - 
 
confirmed in the change regressions, with the India indicator significant and the coefficient 
suggesting that India posted an increase in the size of the services sector that was 10 
percentage points of GDP greater than for the average country, after controlling for the level 
of income and growth. .  
 
Finally, India is again a negative outlier in terms of the employment share in services, falling 
below other countries by a huge 17 percentage points in 2000. Gordon and Gupta (2004) note 
that unlike other countries, India’s labor’s share in services employment has been flat rather 
than growing with income. To generate the huge increase in value added in services without 
a commensurate increase in employment, labor productivity must have gone up tremendously 
in services.
20 We will shortly explore why. 
 
In sum then, Indian manufacturing showed signs over the post-1980s period of not keeping 
up with the average performance in other, similar, countries. The services sector has indeed 
boomed, but the share of employment in services is significantly below that of countries with 
similar size and similar per capita income. Let us now delve deeper into the details of India’s 
growth to understand what might explain these trends. 
 
C.   Labor and skill intensity in the cross-section 
Recall that around 1980 India specialized in skill- intensive industries and in industries where 
establishments were relatively large in scale. India did not produce an unusually high share 
of labor-intensive products. What happened to this pattern after the 1980s?  
 
In Chart 2, we plot the evolution in the share of output generated in labor-intensive relative to 
non labor-intensive products for India and a selected group of comparator countries. India’s 
share is declining, whereas that of many of the others is either increasing, or decreasing but at 
much higher levels of income. Note that China’s share is also declining but from much 
higher initial levels. Chart 3 supports this view as it shows that the relative share of output 
generated in large scale (typically, capital-intensive) industries has been rising sharply in 
India. 
 
In Chart 4, we plot the evolution in the relative share of output generated in skill-intensive 
industries for India and a selected group of comparator countries. Again, it is striking that 
India’s share in skill intensive manufacturing, which was already high in 1980 despite its 
lower level of per capita income, has been increasing and is at levels reached by Malaysia or 
Korea at much higher levels of per-capita income. There is also a striking contrast with 
China. China’s share of output in skill intensive industries is lower than India’s and has been 
                                                 
20 Gordon and Gupta (2004) argue that the increase in labor productivity in India is not 
because of an increase in capital intensity. Instead, they argue it is because there has been 
greater emphasis in India on skill intensive services.   - 16 - 
 
virtually flat whereas India’s level has been higher and rising. The move toward skill-
intensive goods is also reflected in India’s exports: the share of exports in skill-intensive 
goods has risen sharply from about 25 percent in 1970 to about 65 percent in 2004. It is 
worth noting that these developments are not affected by the fact that our data so far have 
been limited to the registered manufacturing sector in India. Indeed, when we trace the 
evolution of labor- and skill-intensive products in the informal sector, we see the same 
pattern (Chart 5). 
 
These developments are more formally captured in the regressions reported in Table 6 for 
2000. They show that India is not an outlier in terms of the share of manufacturing output or 
employment generated in labor intensive industries, but continues to be strongly so for the 
share of value added and employment in skill-intensive industries and large scale industries: 
the coefficient on the India indicator remains broadly unchanged between 1981 and 2000.   
 
In terms of productivity too, skill-intensive industries stand out while the relative 
productivity of large scale industries has declined further. Relative labor productivity in labor 
intensive industries has remained approximately similar to 1981 (Tables 4 and 6, Panel C).  
 
In other words, the evidence suggests that many of the unique features of India’s 
development that were apparent in 1981 have not changed, despite reforms. The evolution in 
diversification since the unleashing of liberalization in 1980 also supports this interpretation. 
In the cross-section we find that India continues to be an outlier in 2000 on both measures of 
diversification: indeed, when we compare the change in diversification between 1980 and 
2000, we find that India is again an outlier, suggesting that the pace of diversification in India 
after 1980 has been  greater than that for the average country (see Charts 6 and 7).   
 
Part of the explanation for this continuity of trends may be that the reforms have not been 
completed—for example, labor markets remain untouched and education expenditure is still 
skewed. But part of the explanation may be that there is hysteresis in growth paths, perhaps 
as a result of the acquisition of organizational capabilities and specific human capital. So the 
specializations induced by distortions may indeed be accentuated as reforms progress, rather 
than reversed. Some evidence of this possibility comes from examining the growth of the 
Indian states. 
 
IV.   THE STATES’ STORY 
A.   Manufacturing versus services at the level of the states 
The aggregate developments (i.e. for India in the cross-section) are mirrored at the 
development of the states. In Chart 8, we plot the change in share of manufacturing between 
1980 and 2000 at the level of the Indian states against their aggregate growth.  Interestingly, 
the relationship is flat.  Looking at the fast growing states, we see that a number of them—
Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Delhi, Maharashtra, and Karnataka—have seen no change or a 
negative change in the share of manufacturing despite rapid growth rates.  
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The performance of the labor-intensive industries in the cross-section is again reflected at the 
level of the states. Chart 9 suggests there is no relationship between states’ growth and the 
change in the relative share of labor-intensive industries.
21 A number of fast-growing 
states—Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Maharashtra—witnessed a decline in the share of labor-
intensive industries, but so did a number of slow moving states like Madhya Pradesh and 
Uttar Pradesh.  
 
In sum, either the fast growing states have seen constancy or decline in their share of 
manufacturing, or where they has been an increase—Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, and 
Haryana—it has occurred in capital and skill-intensive industries (in the case of Gujarat, 
there has been a huge decline in the textiles industry with a corresponding increase in the 
petrochemical industry; similarly, Andhra Pradesh saw a decline in the share of food. 
beverages, tobacco, textiles, and paper related industries and a large increase in the basic 
metals and alloys industries). 
 
Similarly, the reason that India is such a positive outlier in the cross-section in terms of the 
share of services is that nearly all states in India—regardless of their growth performance—
have seen a uniform shift toward services (see Chart 10 where the increase in share of all 
states in services is uniformly high, with the fastest growing states having the highest 
increase in share). 
 
While services in the aggregate have grown in all states, there seems to have been a 
noteworthy difference between services that are predominantly in the public sector and those 
that are in the private sector. In Chart 11, we plot the change in share of services that are 
predominantly performed by the public sector (such as electricity, public administration, 
railways, and other community services) against average annual state growth, and find a 
negative correlation. By contrast, Chart 12 suggests that the increase in the share of services 
that are predominantly in the private sector (such as business services (including software), 
real estate, and retail trade) is strongly positively correlated with state growth.
22 In short, the 
share of public sector services including administration is growing in the laggard states, 
while the share of private sector services is growing in the fast-moving states.  
 
The important conclusion that emerges therefore from analyzing the performance of the 
Indian states is that since 1980, despite the liberalization policies, India is actually veering 
further away from labor intensive industries. Furthermore, there is no clear pattern of 
                                                 
21 For the analysis at the level of the states, we use the inverse of labor productivity (at the 
All-India level) to rank industries by labor-intensity. 
22 Acharya (2002) has argued that services sector growth is artificially inflated by the large 
wage increase awarded to public sector employees in 1998 by the Fifth Pay Commission. 
Our findings suggest service growth in the fast moving states has been outside the public 
sector.   - 18 - 
 
movement amongst fast growing states towards these industries—instead, they seem to be 
moving into skill intensive services.  
 
B.   Diversification 
Let us now turn to diversification. Chart 13 suggests that there is little relationship between a 
state’s growth in the period 1980-2000 and the increase in its concentration, though if 
anything, it is mildly positive. The majority of states, however, continue to become more 
diversified (that is, the change in their Herfindahl index is negative).  
 
Recall that Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) find that the relationship between diversification and 
income turns negative beyond a threshold level of income. This may well be what has been 
happening in India – while states in general continue to become more diversified, a number 
of fast-growing states—Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, West Bengal, Delhi and Maharashtra—saw 
stagnation or declines in their share of manufacturing and a sharp rise in the share of 
services. These states have also been those that have seen no significant increase in 
diversification (Chart 13). In other words, some of the richer states have started to behave 
like rich countries in starting to specialize in manufacturing even as, or because, they are 
doing less manufacturing and more services. But these states are becoming less diversified 
not because they are reverting to the pattern followed by less developed, labor-abundant 
countries (hence moving left and up the quadratic relationship documented by Imbs and 
Wacziarg (2003)) but more likely because they are behaving more like advanced skill 
intensive countries (hence moving right and up the quadratic relationship). 
 
V.   UNDERSTANDING POST-1980 PERFORMANCE 
We have argued that some of the degree to which India was diversified in the past was a 
result of past policies. One might expect that as controls came off, some of this 
diversification would be reversed. Yet instead of reverting to labor intensive manufacturing 
growth—the specialization undertaken by many Asian countries at India’s stage of 
development—India and its fast growing states appear to be skipping a stage – specializing in 
skill intensive and large scale industries, and services. We will show that the performance of 
the fastest moving states seems to be driven both by the capabilities they possessed at the 
dawn of liberalization and the business environment they created. What is indisputable is 
liberalization allowed states to stretch to achieve their potential, instead of being held down 
by a centralized “convoy” system that forced each state to move at a common but mediocre 
growth rate. 
 
A.   Pre-existing capabilities 
Economic development results from the interaction of growth opportunities with the right 
fundamentals (the pre-existing capabilities) that allow these opportunities to be exploited. In 
the conventional view of the Indian development process, there was a long and dark period—
the period of controls and import substitution—followed by a burst of sunlight and reforms 
since 1991. The boom in the IT-industry first awakened observers to the fact that the dark   - 19 - 
 
age was not all dark, that important cumulative capabilities were being built that yielded 
rewards with a lag, and that these capabilities were as important as the (largely external) 
opportunities that sparked the IT boom. In the case of India, one key capability was 
institutions: democracy, rule of law, free press, universities, and technocratic bureaucracy 
that recent research shows are crucial to economic development. Another key capability that 
has been extensively remarked upon in the context of the IT boom is the pool of skilled 
human capital, built through the technology, management, and research institutes, as well as 
through the public sector, a kind of import substitution effort in skilled human capital 
development, which was integral to the Nehruvian vision.  
 
One proxy for this latter capability could be the extent to which states were diversified across 
manufacturing. There are two arguments why the extent of diversification may capture state 
level capabilities. One simply is that those states that had a vibrant and entrepreneurial 
private sector should have diversified the most in response to the pre-1980 distortions (for 
example, into areas that were not dominated by the public sector). Thus the extent of  
diversification in the early 1980s captures the vibrancy of entrepreneurship in the state.  
 
Another is to see the diversification as driven by a broader set of forces than only the private 
sector, and including the public sector. In this view, India’s pre-1980s development strategy, 
which led to unusually (compared with other countries) large diversification also created 
within India a pattern of capability in the different states that played a key role in economic 
performance when the constraints placed on the states were lifted in the post-1980s period.
23 
For instance, engineers who originally were employed by the state-owned Computer 
Maintenance Corporation or Electronic Corporation of India Ltd (ECIL) provided the 
backbone for many of the computer firms that started up in Bangalore. Similarly, many of the 
key players in the explosive growth of the financial sector in Mumbai were alumni of the 
State Bank of India; Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) was a substantial supplier of 
managerial talent for many private sector firms; even the much-derided Indian Airlines plied  
the private sector with highly qualified pilots. 
 
Both arguments suggest that the degree of diversification in the early 1980s proxies for some 
capability that led to the stronger growth of diversified states, they differ only insofar as 
whether the capability was latent (that is, diversification simply proxies for the state’s private 
sector entrepreneurial zeal), or created through diversification itself.  
 
Whatever the source of this capability, did it matter for growth? Chart 14 sheds light on this 
question. In the chart, we plot the Herfindahl coefficient of concentration within 
                                                 
23 This is consistent with the findings in Aghion et. al. (2005) who show that states that were 
closest to the technological frontier were the ones that benefited most from the reforms of the 
early 1990s. It is also consistent with Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) who show that states 
with the greatest manufacturing capability pre-1980s were the ones that benefited most post-
1980s.   - 20 - 
 
manufacturing in the different states in the early 1980s against the subsequent overall growth 
rates. The chart shows a very strong correlation between the initial level of diversification of 
manufacturing in a state and the state’s subsequent economic performance.  
 
Using state-level data for the period 1960-2000 compiled and recently released by the 
Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation, we put the correlation observed in 
Chart 14 on firmer ground. We create a panel dataset with variables defined for four 
decades—1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. We run standard growth regressions with a 
measure of each state’s economic performance in each decade as the left hand side variable.    
The inclusion of state fixed effects makes the specification very general. Since we are 
interested in the differential effect of manufacturing concentration across decades, we 
interact the explanatory variables with the appropriate decadal dummies. In the first five 
columns of Table 7, the left hand side variable is measured over decades, while in the last 
five it is an average over 20 years. In all cases, we find that the initial level of concentration 
in manufacturing is strongly negatively correlated with subsequent economic performance 
especially in 1990 but not in 1980 or the decades prior to the onset of reforms. This suggests 
the capability proxied for by diversification came into its own when the shackles on state 
growth were removed, but did not matter before. 
 
In columns 5-6 and 11-12 of Table 7, the coefficient on diversification interacted with the 
1990s dummy is significant even after controlling for the quality of the institutions in the 
states (columns 5 and 11) and for literacy levels (columns 6 and 12). Thus, the diversification 
measure is picking up something beyond these attributes of states. 
 
Of course, an immediate question is whether fast-growing states simply continued doing 
what they were doing, only with more resources – in other words, were the capabilities 
specific to the industries that existed in the state? We determine the correlations, state by 
state, of the value added in each industry in 1980 with the value added in 1997. If fast 
moving states were simply doing what they did before, the correlation should be strongest for 
those states. In fact, as Chart 15 suggests, the faster-growing states show lower correlation, or 
greater churning, across time. This is one piece of evidence that the capabilities that 
diversification proxies for were general. 
 
A second piece of evidence is in Chart 16, which shows that initial diversification in 
manufacturing is also strongly correlated with subsequent growth in services, suggesting that 
the capabilities had broader uses and were not just confined to manufacturing.  
 
In sum, regardless of how the capabilities came about, they helped foster state growth, 
especially when the economy started liberalizing.   
 
B.   Decentralization 
While the formal reforms at the center received tremendous publicity, perhaps less noticed 
was the growing decentralization of policy. The Congress party had held power without a 
break at the center since independence, but the aura of invincibility surrounding it started   - 21 - 
 
waning soon after Indira Gandhi lost the post-Emergency election in 1977. Also, even though 
the Congress party was returned to power at the center through much of the 1980s, a number 
of states were captured by the opposition, often regional or even single-state parties.  
 
No longer could a regional leader be confident that the center—where the party in power 
might be different from that running the state—would dole out its bounty fairly across states, 
and over time. Also, the parties in power could change, so that implicit agreements reached 
by prior governments might not be honored by subsequent governments. Simply put, the 
centrifugal forces created by the dispersion of political power in India did not sit well with 
the enormous centralization of economic power, and the inter-state cross-subsidies the center 
effected through its investment strategy. Something had to give, and it was the latter. This 
trend is summarized by Echeverri-Gent (2001) as follows: “The rise of single-state parties 
has contributed to important changes in national politics. It is an important factor in the 
declining salience of national issues and the growing importance of state-level issues in 
coalitional strategies.” 
 
But this change was about more than the identity and ideology of political actors: it was 
fundamentally about greater devolution in political and economic power toward the states.  
Greater political decentralization meant greater decision-making at the level of the states, 
including on economic issues, not least the ability to attract private sector investment. This 
was, of course, facilitated by the gradual dismantling of the industrial licensing system that 
used regional equity as one of the primary criterion guiding industrial investments.  
 
The rising trend in private investment, as well as the falling trend in public investment, over 
this period (Chart 17) would have contributed to differentiating outcomes between states, 
with private investment more sensitive to differences in policies across states. 
 
We now turn to show that decentralization was a key dynamic that affected post-1980s 
growth performance. Of course, a simple clue to evaluating whether the decentralization 
dynamic at work is to look at comparative growth performance across states. In Table 8, 
column 1, we regress state growth against beginning-of-period per capita GDP interacted 
with decadal dummies. Since there are no other covariates, this specification addresses the 
question of unconditional convergence. In columns 2-4, we add time and state fixed effects to 
answer the question of whether there is conditional convergence. In column 2, the ordinary 
least squares estimator is used, while the estimation in columns 3 and 4 are based on the 
system GMM procedure.
24 For our purposes, the important point is not whether there is 
convergence or divergence on average (which seems to depend on the procedure used) but 
that regardless of estimation procedure, divergences accelerated in the 1990s remains 
unchanged (see also Aiyar, 2001). The coefficients on the income term interacted with an 
indicator for the 1990s is positive and significant. And the coefficient on the 1990s term is 
always greater than that for the previous periods. 
                                                 
24 The ordinary least squares estimation is inconsistent in the presence of a lagged dependent 
variable and fixed effects, and the GMM procedures do not suffer from this shortcoming.    - 22 - 
 
 
We can test the decentralization dynamic in yet another way: if decentralization was indeed 
important, then states’ economic performance should be more closely tied to state-level 
policies and institutions in the post-1980s period than before. After all, if the pre-1980s era 
was about the center deciding where industrial investments should be located, for example, 
where and how much electricity capacity to install, there is little that the states could have 
done to affect economic performance within their borders.  
 
In terms of analysis, this suggests that running state level growth regressions with state level 
variables on the right hand side variables should be more meaningful for the post-1980s 
period than before. We focus on state-level infrastructure and institutions and their impact on 
state-level performance. If the state-level business environment were indeed an important 
determinant, we could hope to pick up its effects in two kinds of regressions.  In the first, we 
use the Rajan-Zingales (1998) methodology to ascertain the impact of infrastructure: in 
particular, if infrastructure were important, it should be the case that in states that have better 
infrastructure, industries that are more infrastructure-intensive should grow faster. Moreover, 
to the extent that differences became more pronounced in the 1990s when state policies 
started mattering as a result of growing decentralization, we should see the effects most 
pronounced in the 1990s.  
 
To estimate these regressions, we need industry growth by states. For the 1980s and 1990s, 
we have 2-digit industry level manufacturing data from the EPW Foundation. 
 
Next, we need a measure of state-level infrastructure development and policy. Such measures 
of infrastructure development could include electricity generation capacity per capita or the 
extent of road and rail networks. There are three problems with these measures. First, they 
were largely central government determined, often a legacy of the pre-reform era. Second, 
capacity creation could have been related to prospects of growth. Third, infrastructure 
capacity could be quite different from infrastructure quality. 
 
Instead, as a joint measure of infrastructure capability as well as state policies affecting the 
quality of infrastructure and the business environment, we use the transmission and 
distribution losses (T&D losses) of state level electricity boards (as a fraction of generating 
capacity). Transmission and distribution losses refer to power that is generated but not paid 
for—in part because some of it is lost along power lines naturally in the process of 
transmission and distribution, but in greater part because it is stolen. In areas where T&D 
losses are high, the quality of power, as reflected in the voltage as well as reliability, is low. 
Thus T&D losses are not directly related to capacity, but are determined by state level 
political decisions. They reflect the quality of both infrastructure and institutions (politicians 
turning a blind eye to power theft by their constituencies, or politicians unwillingness to 
enforce laws, as well as viability and level of corruption in state electricity boards).   
 
We construct infrastructure intensity measures for particular industries from the India input-
output tables.  Specifically, we construct a measure of the amount of electricity used per unit 
of value added of each industry.     - 23 - 
 
In Panel A of Table 9, we report regressions in which the growth rate of industry i in state s 
is regressed on industry and state fixed effects and interactions between our infrastructure 
development and infrastructure intensity measures. In column 1 we present the results for the 
1980s and in column 2 for 1990s;
25 We find that the coefficient on the interaction is negative 
and significant for the 1990s but not for the 1980s. That is, for the 1990s, we find that in 
states that have more T&D losses (worse infrastructure and institutions), industries that are 
intensive in the use of electricity grow slower. These results suggest that decentralization is 
affecting the growth dynamic because a state level policy variable has started influencing a 
state-level outcome. 
 
More generally, state level institutions do appear to have had a greater impact on state 
growth, not just on infrastructure intensive industries. As Chart 18 shows, there is a negative 
correlation between the average T&D losses in 1980-2000 in a state and its growth during 
that period.  
 
In order to explore this further, we turn to whether state-level institutions have an effect on 
state-level growth, and whether that effect is more pronounced recently (see Table 9, Panel 
B).  
 
We then run regressions where the left hand side variable is some measure of decadal state 
level performance (as in Table 7), and on the right hand side we include state fixed effects, 
time/decadal) effects, initial income interacted with the time effects, and the measure of 
state-level institutions interacted with time effects. A test of the decentralization hypothesis is 
that the institutions measure should not yield significant coefficients for the pre-1980s period 
but should do so, especially for the 1990s (we should not expect very strong results for the 




In columns 1-3 we report the coefficient estimates for different combinations of the controls 
when the measure of institutions is T&D losses. In columns 4-8, we vary the measure of 
state-level institutions (including, successively, measures of investment climate, 
                                                 
25 We cannot run these regressions for the 1970s because we do not have state and sector 
level manufacturing data. 
26 In these regressions, the measure of institutions is time-invariant, measured either as the 
average for the 1980-2000 period or for 2000. This raises concerns about endogeneity. Our 
assumption, however, is that institutional quality is fairly persistent which is consistent with 
the high correlation between the historically determined Banerjee and Iyer (2005) measure of 
the non-landlord holdings in colonial India, which could be interpreted as a measure of the 
historical determinants of current institutions, and contemporary institutions. For example, 
the correlation between the Banerjee-Iyer measure and the measure of current investment 
climate is 0.77.    - 24 - 
 
infrastructure penetration, financial sector, mass media, and primary school education). In all 
cases, we find that the interaction coefficient for the 1970s and (in seven out of eight cases 
for the) 1980s are insignificant while the coefficient for the 1990s is significant and has the 
expected sign. This suggests a tighter relationship between state level institutions and state 
level performance in the 1990s.
27   
 
In sum, both state level capabilities and state level policies and institutions seemed to start 
mattering in the 1990s. With the center no longer enforcing inter-state equity, divergences in 
growth rates between states increased. These divergences raise a number of questions that we 
now turn to.  
 
 
VI.    LOOKING AHEAD 
Where is India headed? We have argued that India’s pattern of diversification and growth 
over the last two decades might reflect the consequences of  the peculiar specializations 
created by the pre-1980 policies. Instead of India’s fast growing states reverting to a more 
traditional pattern of specialization in labor intensive industries, commensurate with India’s 
income levels, they appear to have skipped directly to specialization in skill intensive 
industries (within manufacturing) or to services where they appear to have a comparative 
advantage (at least vis a vis other poor countries).
28 
 
In Table 10, we illustrate how unusual the behavior of some of the fast-growing states is. In 
column 1, we compute the level of income at which the average country in the cross-section 
exhibits a declining share of manufacturing and increasing diversification. In column 2, we 
compute the comparable level of income at which the fast-growing states exhibit the same 
characteristic or “pathology.”  The table shows that the Indian states have started behaving 
like industrial countries at nearly a quarter or one-fifth of their income levels.  For example, 
manufacturing should normally start declining at about US$14,700 per capita: yet, Karnataka 
and Maharashtra have seen a decline in the share of manufacturing at an income per capita of 
about US$2700 and US$3400, respectively. A similar pattern is evident with respect to 
diversification. 
 
The impact of the pre-1980s policies combined with decentralization has meant that Indian 
states are more responsible for their economic fortunes, which in turn has led to sharp 
                                                 
27 These results on the impact of institutions (in Table 9) broadly hold even after controlling 
for the initial level of capability, for which we use the initial value of the Herfindahl index as 
a proxy.  
28 For example, with substantial trained personnel in drugs and pharmaceuticals, as well as a 
large, poor, population in need of treatment, the cost of drug trials in India is low, in contrast 
to most other countries where one or the other ingredient is missing.    - 25 - 
 
divergences in their growth rates. With the caveat that Indian states are enormously large 
entities and are internally very diverse, it would appear that the fast growing peninsular states 
are starting to resemble more developed countries in their specialization, while the slow 
growing hinterland states, with still rapidly growing, less well-educated, populations (Table 
11) may not have the capability to emulate them. It may well be that these hinterland states 
(as well as backward areas in the fast-growing states) will have to follow a more traditional 
path of growth, focusing on labor intensive manufacture. But they have not thus far.
29 That 
they have not may be because further reform is needed—in particular, more flexible labor 
laws and an improvement of infrastructure, especially vis a vis the states in the hinterland so 
that these industries can be internationally cost-competitive—to revitalize labor intensive 
manufacturing.  
 
Here again the weight of history may be telling. The archaic labor laws have strong 
organized constituencies, in particular, labor unions tied to political parties, backing them. 
Given the way Indian industry has specialized, the costs of these laws are not experienced by 
incumbents, and the political leadership, or will, to amend them has not emerged.
30 
Furthermore, given that poor governance, which tends to be persistent, in part, explains the 
slow growth of the hinterland states (see chart 18), the needed improvement in governance, 
business climate as well as physical infrastructure will be more difficult in the laggard states. 
In this regard, the high correlation between the historically determined Banerjee and Iyer 
measure (see footnote 26) and current institutions is telling evidence of the yoke of history 
and the difficulty of change.    
 
Even if serious reforms were undertaken in the laggard states, competition from the more 
advanced states will not make it easy for them to grow. First, consider the output side. The 
laggard states are typically distant from ports and airports. Transportation costs will come 
down as infrastructure is built out, but it is unclear whether the improvements will help them 
out-compete the fast-growing peninsular states where many of the initial large-scale 
infrastructure projects are being undertaken, and where ancillary infrastructure exists. Even if 
India moves to using its unskilled labor, one might expect the effects to first be seen in the 
fast-growing states (which have their own share of surplus labor in agriculture) before 
trickling down to the laggard states.  
 
                                                 
29 For example, Chart 9 illustrates that, between 1980 and 2000, the share of labor-intensive 
industries in total value added declined in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, and remained 
unchanged in Orissa and Bihar. 
30 In other words, most commentators look to existing firms to see if labor laws are a 
problem. But existing firms have adapted to these laws, as suggested both by their pattern of 
specialization and their scale. The more pertinent question is whether new firms are kept 
from entering because of the laws. The pattern of specialization in India suggest they are.   - 26 - 
 
On the input side, even labor intensive unskilled manufacturing requires a skilled supervisory 
and managerial force. Despite the large numbers of graduates emerging from universities in 
India, the number of graduates with the skills to work in industry or the service sector is 
relatively limited. With the immense demand for skilled workers in the export oriented 
services industry, wages of skilled workers have been going up very fast.
31 Given the 
extremely competitive situation in (typically tradable) labor intensive industries, highly paid 
supervisory skilled workers are affordable only if they are used very economically relative to 
the use of unskilled labor – if, for example, firms have scale.
32 Here again, the fast moving 
states where the business and political climate is more conducive to scale have an advantage. 
That the advanced skill-intensive part of the Indian economy may be bidding up scarce skills 
in such a way as to slow the growth of labor intensive manufacture, and the exit of surplus 
labor from agriculture, need not imply that the economy is using resources inefficiently (at 
least in a static sense). The immediate adverse consequences of this peculiarly Indian 
externality are, however, more likely to be political. 
 
For if this process continues, the fast-growing states will not only suck the more mobile 
skilled labor from the slow moving states leading to a further hollowing out of prospects, but 
also the divergence in growth rates will increase further. Indeed, there are additional reasons 
for concern. Visaria and Visaria (2003) suggest that based on current fertility rates in 
different states, of the expected 620 million addition to the Indian population between now 
and 2051, 60 percent will be in Bihar, MP, Rajasthan and UP, and only 22 percent will be in 
the fast growing states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Maharashtra. 
With populous laggard states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar having substantial political power 
because of their numbers, the demands for redistribution will increase, as will migration. 
These will create immense political strains between Indian states and the potential for serious 
differences.  
 
Put another way, the convergence phenomenon that typically takes place across countries 
may be impeded in the India of the future by one big difference—the common and mobile 
pool of skilled labor. The very fact of skill-based development in the fast growing states may 
impede labor-intensive development because of the rise in the price of skilled labor. This 
                                                 
31 A recent issue of Business Week notes that: “As India's domestic economy expands, the 
shortfalls are spreading beyond tech. Wages for semi-skilled workers in the textile factories 
of Coimbatore, for example, are up 10% this year, while supervisors' salaries have risen by 
20%. Pay in the banking industry is up 25% in the past year and has more than doubled in hot 
areas such as private equity. Airline pilots have seen wages rise 25%. Overall, Indian salaries 
will rise by 12.8%, compared with inflation of 5.5%, according to human resources 
consultancy Mercer, which warns that continued increases could hurt India's economic 
revival.” 
32 An alternative possibility is that the wages on unskilled labor fall, but wages in agriculture 
may place a floor here.   - 27 - 
 
could induce an Indian variant of Dutch disease (Bangalore Bug so to speak) that would 
reduce the profitability of labor-intensive and tradable manufacturing. In an era of global 
supply chains with wafer-thin profit margins, this might be a substantial impediment to the 
growth of labor-intensive manufacturing in the lagging states. 
 
The obvious solution is not to impede the growth of the fast-movers but to enhance the 
availability of the resource in scarce supply. While the earlier emphasis on funding tertiary 
education at the expense of primary education may well have been an aberration, India may 
now have too little tertiary education of the right kind at this juncture. India does produce an 
immense number of degree holders, but there are serious doubts about the quality of 
education many receive. The number of high quality institutions is still very small, witness 
the extraordinary competition to get into them. In the same way as industry was delicensed, 
India needs to “delicense” higher education, remove the barriers to starting new institutions, 
as well as encourage foreign direct investment here. In short, from a policy perspective, the 
irony is that in order to promote unskilled labor-intensive activities in the future, a great deal 
of attention may need to be paid to fostering the supply of skilled labor.
 33 
 
It may well be that new institutions of higher education are easier to start in the fast-growing 
states. If so, limits on access to out-of-state students (or a refusal to recognize results from 
other state examinations) need to be reduced, and educational standards harmonized across 
states, so that a truly all-India market for higher education can be created. This will then 
create a pool of skilled workers who will be essential to enhance the growth of the now-
laggard states.  
 
In summary, then, changes since the early 1980s—the move toward pro-business and pro-
market economic policies and economic and political decentralization have unleashed 
tremendous economic opportunities, but also—thanks to pre-existing patterns of 
specialization in favor of skilled-based production—have unleashed the gale winds of 
divergence, big time.
34 A unitary India, centralized politically and uniformly mediocre in 
economic performance has given way to multiple Indias with performance more related to 
the capabilities of individual states and the opportunities they create. The fast-growing states 
have fallen into patterns of production that are more similar to the industrial countries than to 
the fast growing East Asian economies.  
                                                 
33 To some extent, there has been an encouraging endogenous response in terms of the 
increased demand for education throughout India triggered by the prospect of better income 
opportunities (see Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004). In fact, using Mincerian wage 
regressions, Desai et. al. (2005) show that the returns to education have increased 
substantially for the two highest levels of educational attainmnent between 1994 and 1999. 
34 It is one of the abiding ironies that the pre-1980s policies, championed on grounds of 
equity and socialism, might be the cause of the divergences in incomes and other disparities 
in more recent years.   - 28 - 
 
 
Ideally, of course, the laggard states would reform on their own—push for scrapping archaic 
labor laws (few realize how pernicious these are because their effects, in terms of the labor-
intensive firms that are unborn, cannot easily be seen), improve infrastructure and the 
business climate —and utilize their vast pools of underemployed low-cost labor to attract 
investment in labor-intensive manufacturing and agri-business. They would thereby catch up 
with the leading states in India.  
 
There is a precedent—Europe had similar disparities but through various  initiatives, 
prosperous Western Europe offered incentives for laggard European countries to reform. The 
external pull set reforms into motion, so much so that some of the former laggards like 
Ireland and Spain are now Europe’s locomotives. If a loosely knit community of nations 
could do it, why can’t a united nation of states? A reformist center—and India cannot afford 
to not have one—could play the role of the European Commission (expanding what the 
center is already doing on the fiscal side) and offer laggard states more incentives to reform. 
 
In this scenario, the pattern of convergence that we saw in the post-war period between 
industrial countries and the East Asian economies would play itself out within India in the 
future. The recent revival of manufacturing growth (we do not have complete data on the 
most recent years, hence this revival is not captured by our study), albeit seemingly heavily 
concentrated in skill intensive and capital intensive industries, offers some hope for this 
scenario. 
 
However, even if the needed reforms were to occur, there is a possibility that powerful forces 
emanating from the common market for resources could slow convergence. If they were to 
do so, India will have to brace itself for a lot of social churning as people move not just in 
search of jobs but also in search of acquiring the human capital to become employable. How 
India reacts to, and shapes, these forces may well be the biggest economic question India 
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Sources: Based on authors’ calculations. Data used is from UNIDO 3-digit industrial statistics database (2003). 
Notes: The nine industries shown here account for 76% of value added in manufacturing sector in 1990 for India. 
Comparator countries comprise: Brazil, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Turkey. 
For these set of comparator countries ratio of total value added in manufacturing from UNIDO to total value added in 
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Sources: Based on authors’ calculations. Data used is from UNIDO 3-digit industrial statistics database (2003). 
Notes: Starting point for all countries is 1981 and the last period is 1996. For classification of above and below 
median labor intensive sectors refer to table 3. 
















   - 35 - 
 
 




































7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5
Log GDP per capita
CHN IND IDN KOR MYS




Sources: Based on authors’ calculations. Data used is from UNIDO 3-digit industrial statistics database (2003). 
Notes: Starting point for all countries is 1981 and the last period is 1996. Relative size is as defined in the text. 
For classification of above and below median sectors by relative size refer to table 3. 
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Sources: Based on authors’ calculations. Data used is from UNIDO 3-digit industrial statistics database (2003). 
Notes: Starting point for all countries is 1981 and the last period is 1996. For classification of above and below 
median skill intensive sectors refer to table 3. 




Chart 5. Ratio of Value Added in Sector Above to Sectors Below Median Labor Intensity 
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Source: Based on authors’ calculations. Data on unregistered manufacturing are from the Central Statistical 
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Herfindahl Index based on value added
 
 
Sources: Based on authors’ calculations. Data used is from UNIDO 3-digit industrial statistics database (2003). 
Notes: Starting point for all countries is 1981 and the last period is 1996. 
CHN stands for China, IND for India, IDN for Indonesia, KOR for Korea, MYS for Malaysia.  
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Herfindahl Index based on employment
  
 
Sources: Based on authors’ calculations. Data used is from UNIDO 3-digit industrial statistics database (2003). 
Notes: Starting point for all countries is 1981 and the last period is 1996. 
CHN stands for China, IND for India, IDN for Indonesia, KOR for Korea, MYS for Malaysia.  
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1 2 3 4 5
Average Annual Growth of NSDP per capita 1980-200 (%)
Change in share of Manufacturing in NSDP 1980-2000
 
 
Sources: Based on authors’ calculations. Data used is  from EPW Research Foundation CD-ROM, Domestic 
Product of  States of  India: 1960-61 to 2000-01. 
Notes: NSDP is the net state domestic product. 
Code State Code State Code State
AP Andhra Pradesh JK Jammu & Kashmir OR Orissa
AS Assam KK Karnataka PJ Punjab
BH Bihar KL Kerala RJ Rajasthan
DL Delhi MH Maharashtra TN Tamil Nadu
GJ Gujarat MN Manipur TP Tripura
HP Himachal Pradesh MP Madhya Pradesh UP Uttar Pradesh
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Average annual growth rate of NSDP per capita (%) 1980-2000
Change in ratio of above median to below median labor intensive industries
 
 
Sources: Based on authors’ calculations. Data is used from EPW Research Foundation CD-ROMs, Domestic 
Product of  States of  India: 1960-61 to 2000-01 and Annual Survey of Industries. 
Notes: NSDP is the net state domestic product. On vertical axis is the change in ratio of valued added in above 
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Average Annual Growth of NSDP per capita 1980-200 (%)
Change in share of Services in NSDP 1980-2000
 
 
Sources: Based on authors’ calculations. Data used is from EPW Research Foundation CD-ROM, Domestic 
Product of  States of  India: 1960-61 to 2000-01. 
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Average Annual Growth of NSDP per capita 1980-2000 (%)
Change in share of Public Services in NSDP 1980-2000
 
Sources: Based on authors’ calculations from EPW Research Foundation CD-ROM, Domestic Product of  
States of  India: 1960-61 to 2000-01. 
Notes: NSDP is the net state domestic product. Selected public sector services include electricity, public 
administration, railways and other public sector services. 
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Average Annual Growth of NSDP per capita 1980-2000 (%)
Change in share of Private Services in NSDP 1980-2000
 
Sources: Based on authors’ calculations from EPW Research Foundation CD-ROM, Domestic Product of  
States of  India: 1960-61 to 2000-01. 
Notes: NSDP is the net state domestic product. Selected private sector services include business services, 
real estate and retail trade.   - 45 - 
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Sources: Based on authors’ calculations. Data used is from EPW Research Foundation CD-ROM, Domestic 
Product of  States of  India: 1960-61 to 2000-01 and 3-digit industry level data at the state level is from Circon 
India Data Center. 
Notes: NSDP is the net state domestic product. HI is the Herfindahl Index based on value added. Herfindahl 
Index is the measure of diversification used. Change in Herfindahl Index is calculated as the difference between 
Herfindahl Index averaged for 1982, 1984, 1985 and Herfindahl Index averaged for 1995-1997.   - 46 - 
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Average annual growth rate of NSDP per capita 1980-2000(%)
Diversification Index
 
Sources: Based on authors’ calculations. Data used is from EPW Research Foundation CD-ROMs, Domestic 
Product of  States of  India: 1960-61 to 2000-01 and 3-digit industry level data at the state level is from Circon 
India Data Center. 
Notes: NSDP is the net state domestic product. HI is the Herfindahl Index based on value added. Herfindahl 
Index is the measure of diversification used. Herfindahl Index is a measure of concentration. The lower the 
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Average Annual Growth of NSDP per capita 1980-2000 (%)
Correlation between share of value added in 1982 and 1997
 
Sources: Based on authors’ calculations. Data used is from EPW Research Foundation CD-ROM, Domestic 
Product of  States of  India: 1960-61 to 2000-01 and 3-digit industry level data (NIC-1987) at the state level is 
from Circon India Data Center. 
Notes: NSDP is the net state domestic product. On the vertical axis is the correlation between the share of value 
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Average annual growth rate of services per capita 1980-2000(%)
Initial Diversification Index and Services
 
 
Sources: Based on authors’ calculations. Data used is from EPW Research Foundation CD-ROMs, Domestic 
Product of  States of  India: 1960-61 to 2000-01 and 3-digit industry level data at the state level is from Circon 
India Data Center. 
Notes: HI is the Herfindahl Index based on value added. Herfindahl Index is the measure of diversification 
used. Herfindahl Index is a measure of concentration. The lower the index the lower is concentration and the 



















Chart 17. Public and Private Investment 
Public, Private, and Private Corporate Investment in India 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on national accounts data from CSO.  
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Average annual growth rate of NSDP per capita 1980 - 2000(%)
T & D losses and Growth
 
Sources: Based on authors’ calculations. Data used is from EPW Research Foundation CD-ROM, Domestic 
Product of  States of  India: 1960-61 to 2000-01. 
Notes: NSDP is the net state domestic product. Transmission and distribution losses (T&D) is the fraction of 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Agriculture Manufacturing Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services
India 38.9 16.3 24.5 36.6 68.1 13.9 18.6
Brazil 11.0 33.5 43.8 45.2 29.3 24.7 46.1
China 30.1 40.5 48.5 21.4 68.7 18.2 11.7
Indonesia 24.0 13.0 41.7 34.3 55.9 13.2 30.2
Korea 15.1 28.6 40.5 44.4 34.0 29.0 37.0
Malaysia 22.6 21.6 41.0 36.3 37.2 24.1 38.7
Mexico 9.0 22.3 33.6 57.4 23.5 26.5 49.0
Thailand 23.2 21.5 28.7 48.1 70.8 10.3 18.9
Turkey 26.4 14.3 22.2 51.4 43.0 34.9 22.1
Low Income 36.4 14.8 24.4 39.2 74.6 8.7 16.5
Lower Middle Income 21.5 29.1 41.7 36.8 64.0 18.5 16.4
India 24.6 15.9 26.6 48.8 59.3 18.2 22.4
Brazil 7.3 17.1 28.0 64.7 24.2 19.3 56.5
China 16.4 34.7 50.2 33.4 46.9 23.0 29.9
Indonesia 17.2 24.9 46.1 36.7 45.3 17.3 37.3
Korea 4.3 26.1 36.2 59.5 10.9 28.0 61.0
Malaysia 8.8 32.6 50.7 40.5 18.4 32.2 49.5
Mexico 4.2 20.3 28.0 67.8 17.5 26.9 55.2
Thailand 9.0 33.6 42.0 49.0 48.8 19.0 32.2
Turkey 15.4 15.7 25.3 59.4 34.5 24.5 40.9
Low Income 27.3 14.1 26.6 46.1 64.5 12.3 23.2
Lower Middle Income 12.5 24.2 38.3 49.1 43.2 18.5 38.3
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005, except Korea, OECD-Stractural Analysis Database, 
and India,  National Accounts Statistics, Indiastat.com
Notes: For the Low Income, and Lower Middle Income groups as classified by the World Bank, we report the respective averages.
Employment shares are reported for the years indicated, except India(1983), Brazil (1981 and 1999) and Turkey (1982).
Employment shares for the low income group for 2000 are estimates.
1980
2000
Table 1. Sectoral Shares in Value-Added and Employment
Employment in Sector as Percent 
of Total Employment
 Value Added as Percent of GDP
-51-(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log GDP per capita 15.37 21.58 36.27** 27.81 26.76 22.09 66.5** 67.20**
(14.58) (13.75) (17.01) (17.79) (20.8) (20.8) (29.07) (30.07)
Log GDP per capita
2  -0.73 -1.09 -1.95* -1.46 -1.17 -0.92 -3.15* -3.19*
(0.88) (0.83) (1.03) (1.08) (1.2) (1.2) (1.71) (1.76)
India indicator 4.58*** 2.33 -6.50*** -3.55** -0.260 0.560 -7.41** -7.53**
(1.25) (1.76) (1.3) (1.61) (2.52) (2.82) (3.27) (3.63)
Control for country size No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 101 101 122 122 44 44 43 43
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses
***represents significance at 1%, **represents significance at 5%, *represents significance at 10%
Country size is measured by area in square killometers.
Table 2:  India in the cross section: Share of manufacturing and services, early 1980s
Manufacturing Services


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1960-2000 1960-2000 1960-2000 1960-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Log Initial NSDP per capita 0.94** -6.99*** 0.51 -8.37
(0.37) (2.22) (0.76) (6.42)
Log Initial NSDP per capita*1970s dummy -0.03 -0.16 -0.03 0.11
(0.04) (0.71) (0.04) (0.09)
Log Initial NSDP per capita*1980s dummy 0.16*** 0.43 0.17*** 0.4**
(0.04) (0.78) (0.04) (0.17)
Log Initial NSDP per capita*1990s dummy 0.17*** 2.3** 0.19*** 0.69**
(0.06) (1.05) (0.07) (0.34)
Observations 79 79 79 58
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is the annual average decadal rate of growth in per capita state domestic product.
The regressions for conditional convergence in columns 2-4 include state and time fixed effects. The system GMM estimator
is based on Blundell and Bond (1998) and the difference estimator is based on Arellano and Bond (1991).
The Hansen test of overidentification and the test of no second order autocorrelation are satisfied for the system and difference GMM estimations.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses
***represents significance at 1%, **represents significance at 5%, *represents significance at 10%
Table 8. Indian States: Convergence and Divergence, 1960-2000
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e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
;
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
a
n
d
 
d
e
c
a
d
e
,
 
i
t
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
a
c
r
o
s
s
U
N
I
D
O
,
 
2
0
0
3
 
i
n
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
i
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
L
a
b
o
r
 
I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
R
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
t
o
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
2
-
d
i
g
i
t
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l
 
C
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
1
9
8
7
E
P
W
R
F
,
 
A
S
I
i
n
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
i
,
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
s
(
N
I
C
 
1
9
8
7
)
S
k
i
l
l
 
I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
R
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
r
e
m
u
n
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
h
i
g
h
l
y
 
s
k
i
l
l
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
s
k
i
l
l
e
d
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
i
n
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
j
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
o
f
 
t
h
a
t
S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
,
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
s
i
n
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
i
s
e
c
t
o
r
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
1
9
8
9
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
F
i
r
m
 
S
i
z
e
T
h
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
(
o
r
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
)
 
p
e
r
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
a
n
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
U
N
I
D
O
,
 
2
0
0
3
a
d
d
e
d
 
(
o
r
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
)
 
p
e
r
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
.
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
S
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
1
9
8
1
 
a
n
d
 
2
0
0
0
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
o
r
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
a
s
 
a
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
,
 
2
0
0
5
,
 
W
D
I
O
u
t
p
u
t
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
.
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
S
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
1
9
8
1
 
a
n
d
 
2
0
0
0
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
o
r
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
a
s
 
a
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
,
 
2
0
0
5
,
 
W
D
I
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
.
I
n
d
i
a
s
t
a
t
.
c
o
m
 
f
o
r
 
I
n
d
i
a
R
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
A
d
d
e
d
R
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
m
 
o
f
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
a
l
l
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
m
 
o
f
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
o
f
 
a
l
l
U
N
I
D
O
,
 
2
0
0
3
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
 
b
e
l
o
w
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
,
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
 
i
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
o
f
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
,
 
o
r
 
s
k
i
l
l
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
o
r
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
f
i
r
m
 
s
i
z
e
.
 
C
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
 
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
l
o
n
g
 
e
a
c
h
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
 
i
s
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
1
.
 
L
i
s
t
 
o
f
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
D
a
t
a
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
s
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
:
 
D
a
t
a
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
-62-T
a
b
l
e
 
3
.
R
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
A
d
d
e
d
R
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
m
 
o
f
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
a
l
l
 
u
n
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
,
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
C
e
n
t
r
a
l
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
 
O
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
C
S
O
)
,
i
n
 
U
n
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
s
u
m
 
o
f
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
a
l
l
 
u
n
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
 
b
e
l
o
w
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
,
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
I
n
d
i
a
 
(
G
O
I
)
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
i
n
 
I
n
d
i
a
 
i
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
o
f
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
o
r
 
s
k
i
l
l
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
.
 
R
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
R
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
m
 
o
f
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
a
l
l
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
m
 
o
f
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
 
i
n
 
a
l
l
U
N
I
D
O
,
 
2
0
0
3
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
 
b
e
l
o
w
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
,
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
 
i
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
o
f
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
o
r
 
s
k
i
l
l
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
o
r
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
f
i
r
m
 
s
i
z
e
.
 
C
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
 
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
l
o
n
g
 
e
a
c
h
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
 
i
s
 
i
n
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
3
.
 
R
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
A
d
d
e
d
R
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
p
e
r
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
 
i
n
 
a
l
l
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
p
e
r
U
N
I
D
O
,
 
2
0
0
3
P
e
r
 
W
o
r
k
e
r
w
o
r
k
e
r
 
i
n
 
a
l
l
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
 
b
e
l
o
w
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
,
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
 
i
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
o
f
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
o
r
 
s
k
i
l
l
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
o
r
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
f
i
r
m
 
s
i
z
e
.
 
C
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
 
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
l
o
n
g
 
e
a
c
h
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
 
i
s
 
o
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
3
.
 
D
e
c
a
d
a
l
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
n
e
t
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
(
N
S
D
P
)
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
E
P
W
R
F
,
 
D
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
o
f
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
R
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
s
 
1
9
6
0
-
1
9
7
0
,
 
1
9
7
0
-
1
9
8
0
,
 
1
9
8
0
-
1
9
9
0
,
 
a
n
d
 
1
9
9
0
-
2
0
0
0
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
o
f
 
I
n
d
i
a
:
 
1
9
6
0
-
6
1
 
t
o
 
2
0
0
0
-
0
1
2
0
-
y
e
a
r
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
n
e
t
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
(
N
S
D
P
)
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
E
P
W
R
F
,
 
D
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
o
f
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
R
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
s
 
1
9
6
0
-
1
9
8
0
 
a
n
d
 
1
9
8
0
-
2
0
0
0
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
o
f
 
I
n
d
i
a
:
 
1
9
6
0
-
6
1
 
t
o
 
2
0
0
0
-
0
1
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
E
P
W
R
F
,
 
A
S
I
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
i
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
s
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
v
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
 
t
o
 
b
e
l
o
w
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
1
9
8
0
 
a
n
d
 
1
9
9
7
.
 
C
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
 
i
s
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
a
u
t
h
o
r
s
B
e
s
l
e
y
-
 
B
u
r
g
e
s
s
 
I
n
d
e
x
I
n
d
e
x
 
c
o
m
e
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
s
t
a
t
e
-
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
a
m
e
n
d
m
e
n
t
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l
 
D
i
s
p
u
t
e
s
 
A
c
t
 
o
f
 
1
9
4
7
.
 
B
e
s
l
e
y
 
 
B
e
s
l
e
y
 
a
n
d
 
B
u
r
g
e
s
s
 
(
2
0
0
0
4
)
a
n
d
 
B
u
r
g
e
s
s
 
c
o
d
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
w
a
y
:
 
1
 
f
o
r
 
a
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
i
s
 
p
r
o
-
w
o
r
k
e
r
,
 
0
 
f
o
r
 
a
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
i
s
 
j
u
d
g
e
d
 
n
o
t
 
t
o
 
a
f
f
e
c
t
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
r
g
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
p
o
w
e
r
 
o
f
 
e
i
t
h
e
r
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
 
o
r
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
-
1
 
 
f
o
r
 
a
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
i
s
 
r
e
g
a
r
d
e
d
 
a
s
 
p
r
o
-
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
.
 
U
s
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
a
 
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
i
s
 
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
m
a
p
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
t
i
r
e
 
h
i
s
t
o
r
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
.
H
e
r
f
i
n
d
a
h
l
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
C
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
c
r
o
s
s
 
3
-
d
i
g
i
t
 
I
S
I
C
(
 
R
e
v
.
 
2
)
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
,
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
H
e
r
f
i
n
d
a
h
l
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
v
a
l
u
e
U
N
I
D
O
,
 
2
0
0
3
V
a
l
u
e
 
A
d
d
e
d
a
d
d
e
d
.
F
o
r
 
I
n
d
i
a
n
 
s
t
a
t
e
s
,
 
t
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
c
r
o
s
s
 
3
-
d
i
g
i
t
 
(
N
I
C
-
1
9
8
7
)
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
C
i
r
c
o
n
 
I
n
d
i
a
 
D
a
t
a
 
C
e
n
t
e
r
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
H
e
r
f
i
n
d
a
h
l
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
H
e
r
f
i
n
d
a
h
l
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
C
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
c
r
o
s
s
 
3
-
d
i
g
i
t
 
I
S
I
C
 
(
R
e
v
.
 
2
)
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
,
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
H
e
r
f
i
n
d
a
h
l
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
U
N
I
D
O
,
 
2
0
0
3
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
.
 
S
e
c
t
o
r
a
l
 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
R
a
t
e
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
r
e
a
l
 
g
r
o
s
s
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
o
f
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
i
(
 
2
-
d
i
g
i
t
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l
E
P
W
R
F
,
 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
S
u
r
v
e
y
 
o
f
 
C
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
N
I
C
-
1
9
8
7
)
)
 
i
n
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
s
.
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
.
E
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
i
t
y
 
I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
T
h
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
e
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
i
t
y
 
i
n
p
u
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
o
f
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
i
,
 
i
n
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
.
C
S
O
,
 
G
O
I
o
f
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
i
I
n
p
u
t
-
O
u
t
p
u
t
 
T
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
T
a
b
l
e
1
9
8
9
 
a
n
d
 
1
9
9
9
.
O
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
I
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
T
h
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
m
 
o
f
 
e
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
i
t
y
,
 
t
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
p
u
t
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
C
S
O
,
 
G
O
I
I
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
i
a
d
d
e
d
 
o
f
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
i
,
 
i
n
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
.
I
n
p
u
t
-
O
u
t
p
u
t
 
T
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
T
a
b
l
e
1
9
8
9
 
a
n
d
 
1
9
9
9
.
T
r
a
n
s
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
T
h
e
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
e
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
a
l
 
p
o
w
e
r
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
t
e
d
 
b
u
t
 
n
o
t
 
p
a
i
d
 
f
o
r
,
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
a
s
 
a
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
P
l
a
n
n
i
n
g
 
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
-63-D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
L
o
s
s
e
s
 
(
T
D
)
i
n
 
1
9
8
0
.
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
I
n
d
i
a
a
t
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
s
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
C
l
i
m
a
t
e
O
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
a
t
t
r
a
c
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
,
 
t
h
a
t
 
t
a
k
e
s
 
i
n
t
o
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
a
c
t
u
a
l
 
i
n
f
l
o
w
 
I
n
d
i
c
u
s
 
A
n
a
l
y
t
i
c
s
,
a
t
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
s
o
f
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
t
o
 
G
S
D
P
,
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
F
D
I
 
a
p
p
r
o
v
e
d
 
t
o
 
N
S
D
P
,
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
H
o
w
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
D
o
i
n
g
,
 
2
0
0
2
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
 
i
n
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
a
t
 
B
I
F
R
,
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
s
c
a
l
e
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
 
t
o
 
s
i
c
k
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
s
c
a
l
e
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
p
r
o
p
o
s
e
d
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
t
o
 
N
S
D
P
,
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
 
b
a
n
k
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
 
t
o
 
G
S
D
P
,
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
a
g
e
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
G
S
D
P
.
I
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
P
e
n
e
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
S
p
r
e
a
d
 
o
f
 
i
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
a
 
s
t
a
t
e
,
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
v
e
r
s
e
 
o
f
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
v
i
l
l
a
g
e
s
 
n
o
t
 
I
n
d
i
c
u
s
 
A
n
a
l
y
t
i
c
s
,
a
t
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
s
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
p
u
c
c
a
 
r
o
a
d
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
v
i
l
l
a
g
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
e
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
i
t
y
,
 
t
h
e
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
h
a
b
i
t
a
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
H
o
w
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
D
o
i
n
g
,
 
2
0
0
2
d
r
i
n
k
i
n
g
 
w
a
t
e
r
,
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
n
g
t
h
 
o
f
 
r
o
a
d
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
g
e
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
a
l
 
a
r
e
a
 
o
f
 
t
h
a
t
 
s
t
a
t
e
,
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
n
g
t
h
 
o
f
 
r
a
i
l
w
a
y
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
g
e
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
a
l
 
a
r
e
a
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
,
 
t
h
e
 
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
s
u
b
s
c
r
i
b
e
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
G
S
D
P
.
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
c
t
o
r
 
S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
T
h
e
 
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
,
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
 
f
o
r
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
,
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
I
n
d
i
c
u
s
 
A
n
a
l
y
t
i
c
s
,
a
t
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
s
 
o
f
 
g
r
o
s
s
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
f
r
o
m
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
t
o
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
s
a
v
i
n
g
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
b
a
n
k
 
b
r
a
n
c
h
e
s
 
p
e
r
 
 
H
o
w
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
D
o
i
n
g
,
 
2
0
0
2
c
a
p
i
t
a
,
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
 
b
a
n
k
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
 
t
o
 
G
S
D
P
 
f
r
o
m
 
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
G
S
D
P
 
f
r
o
m
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
e
.
 
M
a
s
s
 
M
e
d
i
a
 
P
e
n
e
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
M
e
d
i
a
 
o
u
t
r
e
a
c
h
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
e
a
c
h
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
d
a
i
l
y
 
n
e
w
s
p
a
p
e
r
s
 
s
o
l
d
 
t
o
 
I
n
d
i
c
u
s
 
A
n
a
l
y
t
i
c
s
,
a
t
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
s
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
c
a
b
l
e
 
T
V
 
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
p
e
r
 
t
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
T
V
 
s
e
t
s
H
o
w
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
D
o
i
n
g
,
 
2
0
0
2
o
w
n
e
d
 
p
e
r
 
t
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
r
a
d
i
o
s
 
o
w
n
e
d
 
p
e
r
 
t
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
 
l
i
t
e
r
a
c
y
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
a
l
l
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
.
P
r
i
m
a
r
y
 
S
c
h
o
o
l
i
n
g
 
E
n
r
o
l
l
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
c
l
a
s
s
e
s
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
E
n
g
l
i
s
h
,
 
a
s
 
a
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
n
r
o
l
l
m
e
n
t
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
 
a
n
d
E
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
r
y
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
I
n
d
i
a
:
i
n
 
E
n
g
l
i
s
h
 
a
t
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
s
 
u
p
p
e
r
 
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
i
n
 
2
0
0
1
-
2
0
0
2
.
A
n
a
l
y
t
i
c
a
l
 
R
e
p
o
r
t
 
2
0
0
3
,
D
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
G
O
I
)
A
d
u
l
t
 
L
i
t
e
r
a
c
y
 
R
a
t
e
C
o
m
b
i
n
e
d
 
m
a
l
e
 
a
n
d
 
f
e
m
a
l
e
 
a
d
u
l
t
 
l
i
t
e
r
a
c
y
 
r
a
t
e
.
C
e
n
s
u
s
 
o
f
 
I
n
d
i
a
,
 
2
0
0
1
C
o
l
o
n
i
a
l
 
L
a
n
d
 
T
e
n
u
r
e
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
p
e
r
 
s
t
a
t
e
,
 
o
v
e
r
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
d
a
t
a
,
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
 
a
r
e
a
 
a
s
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
a
r
e
a
 
a
s
 
B
a
n
e
r
j
e
e
 
a
n
d
 
I
y
e
r
 
(
2
0
0
5
)
S
y
s
t
e
m
 
a
t
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
s
a
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
.
 
T
h
e
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
v
a
r
i
e
s
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
0
,
 
f
o
r
 
e
n
t
i
r
e
l
y
 
l
a
n
d
l
o
r
d
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
c
o
l
o
n
i
a
l
 
l
a
n
d
 
t
e
n
u
r
e
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
,
 
 
a
n
d
 
1
,
 
f
o
r
 
e
n
t
i
r
e
l
y
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
t
e
n
u
r
e
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
.
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